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RECENT BOOKS 
CRIMINAL LAW. By Richard C. Donnelly, Joseph Goldstein and Richard 
D. Schwartz. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1962. Pp. xxvi, 1169. 
$15. 
Perhaps the fact that this work is reviewed at all in a law review aimed 
at a general readership is sufficient to vouch for both its uniqueness and its 
worth, for it is a "casebook" intended for classroom use and not a "text" or 
"treatise." Under the usual ground rules, therefore, it should be reviewed in 
the Journal of Legal Education or some other periodical aimed primarily 
at the teaching profession. But the terms "casebook," "text" and "treatise" 
imply a system by which suitability for reviewing is to be determined; when 
no label quite fits, reviewability must be determined on other than a basis 
of denomination. By the same token, when a persuasive idea, concept or 
system appears which does not fit the usual categories, it is in order to 
re-examine the traditional definitions and analyses. The fact that Professors 
Donnelly, Goldstein and Schwartz have done this in the area of "criminal 
law" is the reason why their work is not necessarily a "casebook" for review 
purposes. 
A traditionalist no doubt will find it a somewhat traumatic experience 
to leaf through this book. For where are the categories of offenses against 
the person, offenses against the habitation, offenses against property, other 
offenses, imputability, responsibility and special defenses?1 Where is the 
structural organization based on elements of criminal liability, qualifications 
in the intent element, disorders of the mind affecting criminal responsibility, 
and where the specific chapters on solicitation and attempt, assault, battery, 
mayhem, false imprisonment, kidnapping, homicide, rape, larceny and 
related offenses, receiving, burglary and arson?2 Where is the capsule 
treatment of criminal procedure? Where are the certain norms inherent in 
the law of crimes? Where can one determine what the law is? 
But a closer examination reveals that one has here a comprehensive 
device for unfolding the human events coldly characterized by the law of 
crimes. In many respects its approach is like that of the Japanese short 
story from which the film and play Rashomon were made,3 in which a rape 
and murder are described several times, as viewed by one of the actors. 
Traditional materials present only one view, and probably a most unreal 
view, of what the problems in the subject area of criminal law are. 
1 Major headings in PERKINS, CRIMINAL LA.w (1957). 
2 Major headings in HARNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LA.w AND PROCEDURE 
(4th ed. 1957) . 
s The story, by Ryunosuke Akutagawa, is actually entitled In a Grove (Yabu no 
Naka) ; it is published by Bantam Books in a collection entitled RAsHoMON AND OTHER 
STORIES (Kojima trans., 1959) • 
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Legislatures, judges and lawyers tend to analyze patterns of human conduct 
as if man were stamped out by machines in various patterns, equipped with 
a self-operated "stop" and "go" button, and regulated by a small governor 
which can either be reset automatically by carefully measured external 
pressures or which the man himself can reset if he is subjected to sufficient 
pressure to do so. Or the "norms" of criminal law are handled as if they 
were realities in themselves, each with its own essence, unrelated to human 
activities except as they come to be applied to the miscreant in the setting 
of the courtroom, and an antiseptic appellate courtroom at that. 
But Criminal Law takes the Rashomon approach; "each of the three 
chapters is an entity which permits a total view of the criminal process, 
though from different vantage points."4 Like Rashomon, it leaves the 
viewer, or reader, discomfited, for where is the specific problem, where the 
pat solution, where the truth? Nevertheless, three views considered sepa-
rately and together may reveal problems and tentative solutions far more 
clearly than any one view alone, particularly that view which has been 
traditionally associated with the teaching of criminal law. 
So in chapter I, the authors present the case of one Dr. Martin, whose 
unorthodox methods of treating disturbed children have led him to 
contravene the terms of the sodomy statute. He has committed a crime--or 
has he? His acts are immoral--or are they? His treatment methods violate 
medical ethics--or do they? His acts worked positive good to the children 
concerned--or did they? They caused positive harm--or did they? The 
doctor himself is a homosexual--or is he? Punishment will not change him 
--or will it? He is a good parole risk--or is he? One cannot avoid the 
questions, what should we do with him and why, with no wholly persuasive 
answer evident. The next part of the same chapter considers absolving or 
mitigating circumstances, the first of which is that based on a claim that the 
act charged as criminal was performed for scientific research purposes. The 
first case is the "Doctors Trial";5 this one is easy. But then comes the 
problem of importing erotica for use in university-level research-is this 
different in quality or kind from the experiments at Auschwitz or 
Ravensbrueck? Was the conclusion which the material was to be used to 
demonstrate any less obvious than those which the German military doctors 
contemplated, or is it only that the harm actually inflicted is less? Next is 
a discussion of the statutes authorizing sterilization of certain classes of civil 
prisoners, and the accepted practices by which prisoners may "volunteer" 
to participate in medical experiments. How are those different from the 
practices in the World War II concentration camps? In terms of the 
motives of the experimenters? In terms of the goodness or badness of the 
4 Preface, p. v. 
II United States v. Karl Brandt, 1 8: 2 Trials of War Criminals (Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals 1949) • 
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inmates? In terms of the degree of actual consent? In terms of the actual 
danger to the participants? Because they were Germans and we are 
Americans?6 Where has the pat answer gone? The second mitigating or 
absolving circumstance is that the act was done for a therapeutic purpose. 
Under anti-contraceptive legislation, should a doctor be penalized if he 
advises a woman whose life will be endangered by an additional pregnancy 
to use contraceptives? Should the woman and her husband be penalized 
for using them? Should they be told that abstinence is the solution?7 Is 
it an answer that in fact contraceptives are sold in the state, or that the 
couple need only travel to an adjoining state to receive contraceptive 
advice? What of the young victim of an interracial rape-can nothing be 
done to terminate her pregnancy? What of the unwanted child which results 
if abortion is not performed? Will termination of pregnancy cause psychic 
trauma to the mother? Will such trauma be more or less in the rape case 
than in a "normal" case? Once more, problems without answers. Similar 
problems are raised in the third part of chapter I concerning whether 
homosexual acts between consenting adults should be penalized; similar 
doubts are created. 
Chapter II, which forms by far the largest portion of the work, is 
directed at "Promulgating a Criminal, Penal, Correctional, or '?' Code." 
Viewed traditionally, there should be no great problem in distinguishing 
"civil" from "criminal." Compulsory commitment of a tubercular or one 
infected with a venereal disease is obviously civil in nature. But what makes 
it so-the lack of fault on the part of the person restrained, the degree 
of danger to the community, the kind of installation in which restraint 
takes place, the availability and type of treatment, or what? What of the 
sex psychopath laws, and what of special laws relating to juveniles? On the 
other hand, ordinance violations are "criminal," but are they "true crimes," 
and are they more or less punitive than the sex psychopath laws? From this 
the authors proceed to consider the purposes of sanctions. What is 
accomplished by use of the death penalty, by detention, by serial or multiple 
punishment when one transaction offends against the laws of more than 
one jurisdiction, by supervised release, by taking the offender's property 
through fines or otherwise, by taking away his respect or standing? 
Traditional materials supply the answers; these materials raise the questions. 
The remaining portion of chapter II examines in detail concepts of the 
criminal act, the state of mind accompanying the act, negating and 
mitigating circumstances, and the relevance of age and physical and mental 
6 The material at 951-965 describing the forced relocation of Japanese resident aliens 
and of American citizens of Japanese ancestry raises sobering questions as to whether 
"it can happen here." 
7 As the Connecticut court did in Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 91, 26 A.2d 582 
(1942). 
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health. Chapter III reconsiders several problems in terms of groups. Each 
part is constructed of equally provocative material. 
Can such a book be used to teach beginning law students? The most 
obvious answer is that it has been so used, and used well; to the reviewer 
there is a feeling of rightness about the materials chosen. They range 
widely through law, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, literature 
and logic; they are all relevant to the questions raised; they summarize the 
differing answers which have been advanced and they suggest avenues 
through which pragmatic action is possible. Will the students achieve 
enough grasp of doctrinal legal materials to pass bar examinations or to 
commence practice? The obvious answer again is found in the fact that 
Yale law graduates8 pass bar examinations with eminent success and take 
their places of honor and respect in the profession. Criminal Law is 
adequately endowed with matter with which to develop in the classroom 
the traditional subject matter: statutory degrees of murder, defenses which 
have been traditionally accepted and rejected in cases of homicide and 
assault, traditional conceptual differences between larceny, obtaining and em-
bezzlement, modern theft legislation, and legislative regulation of conduct 
prejudicial to the public health or economy. No other teaching materials 
available at present provide comparable insight into the development of 
substantive rules of insanity; the extensive coverage of the Durham rule,9 
its aftermath and its alternatives creates a challenging opportunity to 
explore in the classroom the interplay of law and psychiatry in both trial 
and appellate courts. It is true that on the basis of these materials the 
student may not learn the technical details of common-law burglary or 
arson, but such details are readily accessible to one possessed of knowledge 
of techniques of statutory construction who is willing to engage in a 
limited amount of supplementary reading. But in recompense for this non-
exposure to traditional legal metaphysics and this loss of opportunity to 
learn the ritual movements of the "case system," the student should achieve 
the beginnings of insight into the dimensions of human conduct which 
traditional teaching of criminal law obscures. 
Are there drawbacks to the book? There probably are, though the chief 
test of this will come as the book is put to use. One is the sheer size of the 
materials. Selectivity is required, and indeed encouraged by the authors. 
But the instructor who is not also the author may have some difficulty in 
making a selection which does not do violence to the essential thrust of the 
work. First-year students may have great difficulty coping with the extended 
s Messrs. Donnelly and Goldstein are professors of law at Yale; Mr. Schwartz is 
associate professor of sociology at Northwestern. The materials have been used at Yale 
in temporary form for several years. 
9 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
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reading_ assignments which use of these materials probably requires.10 They 
may also have difficulty keeping parallel tracks straight. It is true that 
lawyer, judge, legislator, psychiatrist and sociologist may all direct their 
professional efforts toward the same terminal goal; the materials of each 
discipline are cognate to those of the others. But it is also true that the 
legislature works within limits set by constitution and tradition and couches 
its conclusions in traditional legal language forms, that judges think in and 
are receptive to arguments phrased in terminology which does not appear in 
abstracts of psychiatric publications, and that administrative officials utilize 
terms meaningful to themselves, which perhaps sociologists do not recognize. 
The law student is enriched as he learns of these different conceptual 
frameworks and vocabularies, but the instructor must also exercise care to 
see that he learns when and where a given phrase or argument is most 
likely to be accepted and put to the uses for which it is tendered. It may 
also be that these materials insufficiently incorporate existing penal statutes 
covering offenses against the person, against property and affecting the 
administration of government. But the reviewer is persuaded, at least 
until actual experience proves him wrong, that it is better to promote a 
positive awareness of the vital questions posed by a system of penal (or"?") 
law than to strive for technical proficiency at the expense of an incipient 
grasp of the human and social values involved in a system of criminal law 
administration. 
Is there any value in the book for the practitioner? I submit that there 
is. This is not to say that he will be able to use it as a quick reference on 
particular legal problems, for it is not intended or designed to be used in 
that way. But if he reads it reflectively and searchingly, he may be jolted in 
his complacency concerning criminal law matters. Members of the bar too 
often take refuge in the aseptic regions of tax, corporate or estate law 
practice and abandon utterly any concern about criminal law. Most 
"reputable" lawyers, particularly in metropolitan areas, will not touch 
criminal cases, except perhaps those involving corporate clients. To a 
degree such lawyers can rationalize this attitude so long as they conceive of 
criminal jurisprudence as merely one more body of legal rules, embodying 
no different problems from and bringing in far less financial return than 
cases arising in a civil practice. A perusal of Criminal Law may shatter 
such complacency, and thereby foster a concern for criminal law adminis-
tration which too few lawyers now possess. It might make them somewhat 
more sensitive human beings in the process. 
B. ]. George, Jr., 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
10 The work is typographically attractive, however, and conducive to the reading 
of a large amount of material with relatively little eye fatigue. It is enlivened with 
attractive woodcuts interpreting gargoyles adorning Yale's Sterling Law Building. 
